This paper presents the first efficient statistical zero-knowledge protocols to prove statements such as:
So far, no methods other than inefficient circuit-based proofs are known for proving such properties. Proving the second property is for instance necessary in many recent cryptographic schemes that rely on both the hardness of computing discrete logarithms and of difficulty computing roots modulo a composite.
The main building blocks of our protocols are statistical zero-knowledge proofs that are of independent interest. Mainly, we show how to prove the correct computation of a modular addition, a modular multiplication, or a modular exponentiation, where all values including the modulus are committed but not publicly known. Apart from the validity of the computation, no other information about the modulus (e.g., a generator which order equals the modulus) or any other operand is given. Our technique can be generalized to prove in zeroknowledge that any multivariate polynomial equation modulo a certain modulus is satisfied, where only commitments to the variables of the polynomial and a commitment to the modulus must be known. This improves previous results, where the modulus is publicly known.
We show how a prover can use these building blocks to convince a verifier that a committed number is prime. This finally leads to efficient protocols for
Introduction
The problem of proving that a number n is the product of two primes p and q of special form arises in many recent cryptographic schemes (e.g., [7, 18, 19] ) whose security is based on the infeasibility of computing discrete logarithms and of computing roots in groups of unknown order. In such scheme there typically is a designated entity which knows the group's order and hence can compute roots. Although the other entities must not learn the group's order, they still want to be assured that the order is not smooth, since that would allow the designated entity to compute discrete logarithms. One example of such a group are subgroups of Z * n . In this case, it suffices that the designated entity proves that n is the product of two safe primes, i.e., primes p and q such that (p−1)/2 and (q−1)/2 are primes as well [19] . An other example of such a group are elliptic curves over Z n . There, n must be the product of two primes p and q such that (p + 1)/2 and (q + 1)/2 are also primes [23] . Finally, standards such as X9.31 require the modulus to be the product of two primes p and q, where (p − 1)/2, (p + 1)/2, (q − 1)/2, and (q + 1)/2 have a large prime factor 1 . Previously, the only way known for proving such properties was applying inefficient general zero-knowledge proof techniques (e.g., [21, 6, 14] ).
Our main results are as follows: First, we provide an efficient protocol to prove that a committed integer is in fact the modular addition of two committed integer modulo another committed integer without revealing any other information whatsoever. Then we provide similar protocols for modular multiplication, modular exponentiation, and, more general, to any multivariate polynomial. Previous protocols allow only to prove algebraic relations modulo a publicly known integer [5, 8, 16, 14] were known. Our schemes work also for the class of commitments described in [14] (that includes discrete-logarithm-based and RSA-based commitment schemes). Second, we present an efficient zero-knowledge proof for pseudo-primality of a committed number and, as a consequence, a zero-knowledge proof that an RSA modulus n consists of two safe primes. The additional advantage of this method is that only a commitment to n but not n itself must be publicly known. If the modulus n is publicly known, however, more efficient protocols can be obtained by combining our techniques with known results described in the next paragraph.
Based on the these proofs it is simple to show that a given element a ∈ Z * n has a large order modulo a given n = pq when (p−1)/2 and (q−1)/2 are primes. First the prover shows that n is indeed of this form. Then the verifier checks whether a 2 ≡ 1 1 It should be mentioned, however, that it is unnecessary to add this requirement into the RSA key generation explicitly. For randomly chosen large primes, the probability that (p − 1)/2, (p + 1)/2, (q − 1)/2, and (q + 1)/2 have a large prime factor is overwhelming. This is sufficient to guarantee that the Pollard-Rho and Williams p+1 factoring methods [28, 33] do not work. On the other hand, a proof that an arbitrarily generated RSA modulus is not weak without revealing the prime factors seems to be hard to obtain, as an infinite number of conditions have to be checked (e.g., see [1] ).
(mod n) and gcd(a 2 − 1, n) = 1 holds. From this it follows that a can only be of
Let us finally summarize related results on proving properties of composite numbers. Van de Graaf and Peralta [32] provide an efficient proof that a given modulus n is of the form n = p r q s , where r and s are odd, p and q are primes and p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4). A protocol due to Boyar et al. [3] allows to prove that a given n is squarefree, i.e., there is no prime p with p|n such that p 2 |n. Hence, if for a given n both properties can be shown, it follows that n is of form n = pq, where p and q are primes and p ≡ q ≡ 3 (mod 4). This result was recently strengthened by Gennaro et al. [20] who present a proof system for showing that a number n satisfying certain side-conditions is the product of quasi-safe primes, i.e., primes p and q for which (p − 1)/2 and (q − 1)/2 is a prime power. However, their protocol can not guarantee that (p − 1)/2 and (q − 1)/2 are indeed primes which is what we are aiming for. Let us further mention the work of Boneh and Franklin [2] , who provide a proof that a distributively generated number n indeed consists of two primes (without further showing that these primes are of special form). It should be noted that all these solutions assume that n is publicly known.
Tools

Commitment Schemes
Our schemes build use commitment schemes that allow to algebraic prove properties of the committed value. There are two kinds of commitment scheme. The first kind hides the committed value information theoretically from the verifier (unconditionally hiding) but is only conditionally binding, i.e., a computationally unbounded prover can change his mind. The second kind is only computationally hiding but unconditionally binding. Depending on the kind of the commitment scheme employed, our schemes will zero-knowledge arguments (proofs of knowledge) or be zero-knowledge proof systems.
Cramer and Damgård [14] describe a class of commitment schemes allowing to prove algebraic properties of the committed value. These include RSA-based and discrete-logarithm-based schemes for both kinds of commitment scheme. An example of a computationally binding and unconditionally hiding scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem is the one to Pedersen [27] . Given are a group G of prime order Q and two random generators g and h such that log g h is unknown and computing discrete logarithms is infeasible. A value a ∈ Z Q is committed to as c a := g a h r , where r is randomly chosen from Z Q . For easier description, we will use this commitment scheme for our protocols and hence they will be statistical zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. However, the protocol can easily be adapted to work for all the commitment scheme exposed in [14] .
Various Proof-Protocols Found in Literature
In the following we assume a group G = g of large known order Q and a second generator h whose discrete logarithm to the base g is not known. We define the discrete logarithm of y to the base g to be any integer x such that y = g x holds, i.e., discrete logarithms are allowed to be negative.
We shortly review various systems for proving knowledge of and about discrete logarithms found in literature.
Proving the knowledge of a discrete logarithm x of a group element y to a basis g [11, 30] .
The prover chooses a random r ∈ R Z Q and computes t := g r and sends t to the verifier. The verifier picks a random challenge c ∈ R {0, 1} k and sends it to the prover. The prover computes s := r − cx (mod Q) and sends s to the verifier. The verifier accepts, iff g s y c = t holds. This protocol is an honest-verifier zeroknowledge proof of knowledge for k = Θ(poly(log Q)) and a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for k = O(log log(Q)) and when serially repeated Θ(poly(log Q)) times. This holds for all other protocols described in this section (when not mentioned otherwise). Adopting the notation in [7] , we denote this protocol by PK{(α) : y = g α }, where PK stands for "proof of knowledge".
Proving the knowledge of a representation of the element y to the bases g 1 , . . . , g l [4, 10] , i.e., proving the knowledge of integers
. This protocol is an extension of the previous one to multiple bases. The prover chooses random r 1 , . . . , r l ∈ R Z Q , computes t :
, and sends t to the verifier. The verifier picks a random challenge c ∈ R {0, 1} k and sends it to the prover. The prover computes s i := r i − cx i (mod Q) for i = 1, . . . , l and sends all s i 's to the verifier. The verifier accepts, iff t = y
Proving the equality of the discrete logarithms of the elements y 1 and y 2 to the bases g and h, respectively [12] . Let y 1 = g x and y 2 = h x . The prover chooses a random r ∈ Z * Q , computes t 1 := g r , t 2 := h r , and sends t 1 , t 2 to the verifier.
The verifier picks a random challenge c ∈ {0, 1} k and sends it to the prover. The prover computes s := r − cx (mod Q) and sends s to the verifier. The verifier accepts, iff g s y c 1 = t 1 and h s y c 2 = t 2 holds. This protocol is denoted by PK{(α) :
Note that this method allows also to prove that one discrete log is the square of another one (modulo the group order), e.g., PK{(α) :
Proving the knowledge of (at least) one out of the discrete logarithms of the elements y 1 and y 2 to the base g (proof of OR) [15] . W.l.g., we assume that the prover knows x = log g y 1 . Then
c 2 2 and sends t 1 and t 2 to the verifier. The verifier picks a random challenge c ∈ {0, 1} k and sends it to the prover. The prover computes c 1 := c ⊕ c 2 and s 1 := r 1 − c 1 x (mod Q) and sends s 1 , s 2 , c 1 , and c 2 to the verifier. The verifier accepts, iff c 1 ⊕ c 2 = c and
In their paper [15] , Cramer et al. generalize this approach to an efficient system for proving arbitrary monotone statements built with ∧'s and ∨'s.
Proving that a discrete logarithm lies in a given range. The last building block for our protocols are statistical zero-knowledge proofs that the discrete logarithm x of y to the base g satisfies 2 1 − 2 2 < x < 2 1 + 2 2 for given parameter 1 and 2 . The parameter 2 1 acts as an offset and can also chosen to be zero. In principle, such a proof can be given by committing to every bit of x and proving that the committed values are indeed 0's or 1's and that they are the binary representation of x. Fortunately, there is a much more efficient way to achieve this as is shown in [9, 16] . The price one has to pay is that, first, the protocol is only statistical zero-knowledge and, second, it can only be shown that
, where > 1 is a security parameter, although x must lie in the intervals 2 1 − 2 2 < x < 2 1 + 2 2 for the prover being able to successfully carry out the proof. Finally, if the group's order is known, only binary challenges are possible. Since the protocol is not so well known, we describe it in full detail in Appendix A. The protocol is denoted by
where¨ 2 denotes 2 +2 (we will stick to that notation for the rest of the paper).
It should be mentioned, however, that if the order of the group is not known to the prover (e.g., if a subgroup of an RSA-ring is used) and when believing in the non-standard strong RSA-assumption 2 then larger challenges can be chosen [16, 17] . Although we describe our protocols for the setting where the group's order is known to the prover, all protocols can easily be adapted to the setting where the prover does not know the group's order using the techniques from [16, 17] .
All described protocols can be combined in natural ways. First of all, one can use multiple bases instead of a single one in any of the above proofs. Then, executing any number of instances of these protocols in parallel and choosing the same challenges for all of them in each round corresponds to the ∧-composition of the statements the single protocols prove. Using this approach, it is even possible to compose instances according to any monotone formula [15] . In the following we will use of such compositions without having explained the technical details for composition for which we refer to [5, 8, 15] .
Secret Computations with a Secret Modulus
In this section we assume that a prover has committed to some integers a, b, d, and n. We will provide an efficient protocol for proving that a b ≡ d (mod n) holds for the committed integers without revealing any further information to the verifier (i.e., the proof is zero-knowledge). However, before we can do so, we need protocols to prove that a committed integer is the addition or the multiplication of two committed secret integers modulo a committed secret modulus n.
The algebraic setting is as follows. Let be an integer such that −2 < a, b, d, n < 2 holds and > 1 be security parameters (cf. Section 2). Furthermore, we assume that a group G of order Q > 2 2 +5 (= 2 2¨ +1 ) and two generators g and h are available such that log g h is not known. This group could for instance be chosen by the prover in which case she would have to prove that she has chosen it correctly. Finally, let the prover's commitments to a, b, d, and n be c a :
, and c n := g n h r 4 , where r 1 , r 2 , r 3 , and r 4 are randomly chosen elements of Z Q .
Secret Modular Addition and Multiplication
We assume that the verifier already obtained the commitments c a , c b , c d , and c n . Then the prover can convince the verifier that a + b ≡ d (mod n) holds by running the protocol denoted 3 :
Alternatively, she can convince the verifier that ab ≡ d (mod n) holds by running the protocol
with him.
Remark. In some applications the prover might be required to show that n has some minimal size. This can by showing that η lies in the range
instead of −2¨ < η < 2¨ for some appropriate values of 1 and 2 (cf. Section 2.2). 
holds. Moreover, −2¨ <â < 2¨ , −2¨ <b < 2¨ , −2¨ <d < 2¨ , and −2¨ <n < 2¨ holds for these integers. When running the prover with S + , the knowledge extractor can further compute integersr 5 ∈ Z Q andû with −2¨ <û < 2¨ such that c d /(c a c b ) = cû n hr 5 holds.
Therefore we have gd −â−b hr 3 −r 1 −r 2 = gnûhûr 4 +r 5 and hence, provided that the discrete log of h to the base g is not known, we must havê d ≡â +b +ûn (mod Q) .
Thus we haved =â +b +ûn +wQ for some integerw. Since 2 2¨ +1 < Q and due to the constraints onâ,b,d,n, andû we can conclude that the integerw must be 0 and henced ≡â +b (modn) must hold. Now consider the case when running the prover with S * . In this case the knowledge-extractor can additionally compute integersr 6 ∈ Z Q andv with −2¨ <
As before, because of 2 2¨ +1 < Q and the constraints on onâ,b,d,n, andv we can conclude thatd ≡âb (modn) must hold for the committed values.
Secret Modular Exponentiation
We now extend the ideas given in the previous paragraph to a method for proving that a b ≡ d (mod n) holds. Using the same approach as above, i.e., having the prover to provide an integerã that equals a b (in Z) and proving this fact, would required that G has order about 2 b and thus such a proof would become rather inefficient.
Below we expose a more efficient protocol for proving this which is obtained by constructing a b (mod n) step by step according to the square & multiply algorithm (cf. Appendix B for easy reference). (In practice a more enhanced exponentiation algorithm might be used (see, e.g., [13] ), but one should keep in mind that it must not leak additional information about the exponent.) In the following, we assume that an upper-bound b ≤ on the length of b is publicly known. 
2. To prove that a b ≡ d (mod n) holds, the prover sends all her commitments to the verifier and then they carry out the protocol
Let us now explain why this protocol proves that a b ≡ d (mod n) holds and consider the clauses of sub-protocol S exp . What the Clauses 1-3 prove should be clear. The Clause 4 shows that the c b i 's indeed commit to the bits of the integer committed to in c b (that these are indeed bits is shown in the Clauses [11] [12] [13] [14] . From this it can further be concluded that c b commits to a value smaller that 2 b . The Clauses 5-8 prove that the c v i 's indeed contain a In the following, when denoting a protocol, we will abbreviate the protocol S exp by a clause like α β ≡ γ (mod δ) to the statement that is proven and assume that the prover send the verifier all necessary commitments; e.g.,
Efficiency Analysis
For both S + and S * the prover and the verifier both need to compute 5 multiexponentiations per round. The communication per round is about the size of 10 group elements and 5 bits in case of S + and about the size of 11 group elements and 5 bits in case of S * . In case of the exponentiation proof the verifier and the prover need to compute about 6 b multi-exponentiations per round, while the prover needs to compute about 
Extension to a General Multivariate Polynomial
Let us outline how the correct computation of a general multivariate polynomial equation of form
where all integers x 1 , . . . , x t , a 1 , . . . , a l , b 1,1 , . . . , b l,t , and n might only given as commitments can be shown: The prover commits to all the summands
(mod n) and shows that the sum of these summands is indeed zero modulo n. Then, she commits to all the product terms p 1,1 := x b 1,1 1 (mod n), . . . , p t,l := x b l,t t (mod n) of the product and shows that s i ≡ a i t j=1 p i,j (mod n). Finally, she shows that p i,j ≡ x b i,j j (mod n) using the modular exponentiation proof described above and that for all i the same x j is in p i,j . Clearly, several such polynomials can be combined as well.
A Proof That a Secret Number is a Pseudo-Prime
In this section we describe how the prover and the verifier can carry out a primality test for an integer that is only given by a commitment. Some primality tests reveal information about the structure of the prime and are hence not suited unless one is willing to give away this information. Examples of such tests are the Miller-Rabin test [26, 29] or the one based on Pocklington's theorem. A test that does not reveal such information is the one due to Lehmann [25] which we describe in the next subsection.
Lehmann's Primality Test
Lehmann's primality test is variation of the Solovay-Strassen [31] primality test and based on the following theorem [24] :
Theorem 3. An odd integer n > 1 is prime if and only if
This theorem suggest the following probabilistic primality test:
• check whether a (n−1)/2 i ≡ ±1 (mod n) holds for all i's and whether a (n−1)/2 i ≡ −1 (mod n) holds for at least one i.
The probability that a non-prime n passes this test is at most 2 −k . Note that in case n and (n − 1)/2 are both odd, the condition that a (n−1)/2 i ≡ −1 (mod n) holds for at least one i can be omitted. In this special case the Lehmann-test is equivalent to the Miller-Rabin test and the failure probability is at most 4 −k [29] .
Proving the Pseudo-Primality of a Committed Number
We now show how the prover and the verifier can do Lehmann's primality test for a number committed by prover such that the verifier is convinced that the test was correctly done but does not learn any other information. The general idea is that the prover commits to t random bases a i (of course, the verifier must be assured that the a i 's are chosen at random) and then prove that for these bases a (n−1)/2 i ≡ ±1 (mod n) holds. Furthermore, the prover must commit to a base, sayã, such that a (n−1)/2 ≡ −1 (mod n) holds to satisfy the second condition in Theorem 3. Let be an integer such that n < 2 holds and let > 1 be security parameter. As in the previous section, a group G of prime order Q > 2 2 +5 and two generators g and h are chosen, such that log g h is not known. Let c n := g n h rn with r n ∈ R Z Q be the prover's commitment to the integer on which the primality test should be performed.
The following four steps constitute the protocol.
1. The prover picks randomâ i ∈ R Z n for i = 1, . . . , t and commits to them as câ i := gâ i h râ i with râ i ∈ R Z Q for i = 1, . . . , t. She sends câ 1 , . . . , câ t to the verifier.
2. The verifier picks random integers −2 <ǎ i < 2 for i = 1, . . . , t and sends them to the prover.
3. The prover computes a i :=â i +ǎ i (mod n), c a i := g a i h ra i with r a i ∈ R Z Q ,
. . , t. Moreover, the prover commits to (n−1)/2 by c b := g (n−1)/2 h r b with r b ∈ R Z Q . Then the prover searches a baseã such thatã (n−1)/2 ≡ −1 (mod n) holds and commits toã by cã := gãh rã with rã ∈ R Z Q .
4. The prover sends c b , cã, c a 1 , . . . , c at , c d 1 , . . . , c dt to the verifier and then they carry out the following (sub-)protocol
:
This concludes the protocol. In Step 1 and 2 of the protocol, the prover and the verifier together choose the random bases a 1 , . . . , a t for the primality test. Each base is the sum (modulo n) of the random integer the verifier chose and the one the prover chose. Hence, both parties are ensured that the bases are random, although the verifier does not get any information about the bases finally used in the primality test. That the bases are indeed chosen according to this procedure is shown in the Clauses 19-23 of the sub-protocol S p , the correct generation of the random values a i , committed in c a i , is proved. The Clauses 16-17 prove that indeed (n − 1)/2 is committed in c b and the Clause 18 shows that there exists a basẽ a such thatã (n−1)/2 ≡ −1 (mod n). 
(mod n) ∈ {−1, 1} and thus the conditions that n is a prime with error-probability 2 −t are met. Note that all modular exponentiations in Clause 26 have the same b and n and hence the proofs for these parts can be optimized. In particular, this is the case for the Clauses 3, 4, and 11-14 in S exp .
Theorem 4.
Given a commitment c n to an integer, the above protocol is a statistical zeroknowledge proof that the committed integer is a prime with error-probability at most 2 −t for the primality-test.
Proof. The proof is straight forward from the Theorems 1, 2, and 3.
Similar as for modular exponentiation we will abbreviate the above protocol by adding a clause such as α ∈ pseudoprimes(t) to the statement that is proven, where t denotes the number of bases used in the primality test.
Remark. If (n − 1)/2 is odd and the prover is willing to reveal that, she can additionally prove that she knows χ and ψ such that c b /g = (g 2 ) χ h ψ and −2¨ < χ < 2¨ holds and skip the Clause 18. This results in a statistical zero-knowledge proof that n of form n = 2w + 1 is prime and w is odd with error-probability at most 2 −2t .
Efficiency Analysis
Assume that the commitment to the prime n is given. Altogether t + 1 proofs that a modular exponentiation holds are needed where the exponents are about log n bits. Thus, the verifier needs to compute about 6t log n multi-exponentiations per round and the prover needs to compute about 2t log n multi-exponentiations for the commitments to the intermediary results of the square & multiply algorithm. The communication cost per round is about the size of 12t log n group elements and 4t log n bits and an initial 2t log n group element which are the commitments to the intermediary results of the square & multiply algorithm and the commitments to the bases for the primality test.
Proving that an RSA Modulus Consists of Two Safe Primes
We finally present protocols for proving that an RSA modulus consists of two safe primes. First, we restrict ourselves to the case where the modulus is not known to the verifier, i.e., only a commitment of the modulus is given. Later, we will discuss improvements for cases when the RSA modulus is known to the verifier.
A Protocol For a Secret RSA Modulus
Let 2 be an upper-bound on the length of the largest factor of the modulus and let > 1 be a security parameter. Furthermore, a group G of prime order Q > 2
and two generators g and h are chosen, such that log g h is not known and computing discrete logarithms is infeasible. Let c n := g n h rn be the prover's commitment an integer n, where she choose r n ∈ R Z Q and let p and q denote the two prime factors of n. The following is a protocol that allows her to convince the verifier that c n commits to the product of two safe (pseudo-)primes.
1. The prover computes the commitments c p := g p h rp , cp := g (p−1)/2 h rp , c q := g q h r b , and cq := g (q−1)/2 h rp with r p , rp, r q , rq ∈ R Z Q and sends all these commitments to the verifier.
2. The two parties carry out the following protocol S 51 := PK{(α, β, γ, δ, ρ, ν, ξ, χ, ε, ζ, η) :
where t denotes the number of bases used in the Lehmann-primality tests.
Theorem 5.
Let n be an integer that is committed by c n . Then the above protocol is a statistical zero-knowledge proof that n is an RSA modulus of form n = pq where p, q, (p − 1)/2 and (q − 1)/2 are primes with error-probability at most 2 −t each of for the primality tests.
Proof. The proof is straight forward from the Theorems 1, 2, and 4.
The efficiency is reigned by the (pseudo-)primality-proofs and thus about four times as high as for a single (pseudo-)primality-proof (cf. Subsection 4.3).
A Protocol For a Publicly Known RSA Modulus
We now consider the case where the modulus n is publicly known. In case n fulfils certain side-conditions (see below), it is more efficient to first run the protocol due to Gennaro et al. [20] (which includes the proofs proposed by Peralta & van de Graaf [32] and by Boyar et al. [3] ). This protocol is a statistical zero-knowledge proof system that there exist two integers a, b ≥ 1 such that n consists of two primes p = 2p a + 1 and q = 2q b + 1 with p, q,p,q ≡ 1 (mod 8), p ≡ q (mod 8), andp ≡q (mod 8). Given the fact that (p − 1)/2 and (p − 1)/2 are prime powers, the probability that they pass a single round of the Lehmann's primality test for any a > 1 and b > 1, is at mostp 1−a ≤ 2/(p − 1) andq 1−a ≤ 2/(q − 1), respectively, if they are not prime. Hence, if p and q are sufficiently large, a single round of the Lehmann-primality test on (p − 1)/2 and (q − 1)/2 will be sufficient to prove their (pseudo-)primality.
We now describe the protocol that allows the prover to prove the verifier that a given integer n is the product of two safe (pseudo-)primes.
1. First the prover computes c p := g p h rp , cp := g (p−1)/2 h rp , c q := g q h r b , and cq := g (q−1)/2 h rp with r p , rp, r q , rq ∈ R Z Q and sends these commitments together with n to the verifier.
2. The prover and the verifier carry out the protocol by Gennaro et al. [20] 3. and then the protocol denoted S 52 := PK{(α, β, γ, δ, ρ, , ξ, χ, ε, ζ, η) :
g n /(c p c q ) = h η ∧ γ ∈ pseudoprimes(1) ∧ α ∈ pseudoprimes(1)} .
Theorem 6. Let n = pq be a given integer that passes the test given in [20] with error probability at most 2 −z for an integer z ≥ 1. Then the above protocol is a statistical zeroknowledge proof that n is an RSA modulus of form n = pq where p, q, (p − 1)/2 and (q − 1)/2 are primes with error probability at most 1 − (1 − 2 −z )(1 − 2/(p − 1))(1 − 2/(q − 1)) < 2 −z + 2/(p − 1) + 2/(q − 1) + 2 −z 2/(p − 1) 2/(q − 1).
The efficiency for this protocol is dominated by the efficiency of a single round (i.e., t = 1) of the (pseudo-)primality proof described in the previous section and the efficiency of protocol of Gennaro et al. [20] .
Conclusion
We have presented efficient protocols for proving that modular relations among secret values (including the modulus!) hold and for proving that an given (or only committed-to) number is the product of two safe primes.
We note that it is obvious how to use our techniques to get a protocol for proving that n is the product of two strong primes [22] , i.e., (p − 1)/2, (q − 1)/2, (p + 1)/2 and (q + 1)/2 are primes or have a large prime factor. Lower bounds on p, q, and on n might also be shown. Also, factors r other than 2 in (p − 1)/r could easily be incorporated. 
